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Introduction
This report summarizes discussions that took place at a workshop held in Belfast in January 2018 
that brought together scholars from law, economics, political science, sociology, and peace studies, as 
well as practitioners from international organizations and the case study contexts of Chile, Cambodia, 
Haiti, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. This workshop was organized by the Economic Liberalism, 
Democracy, and Transitional Justice project of the Transitional Justice Institute (TJI), Ulster University.
The project team hosted the workshop to provide a forum for exploratory conversations on the 
intersections between economic liberalism, democracy, and transitional justice, with the intention 
of laying the groundwork for a larger interdisciplinary research project. The team felt that the 
time was ripe for these conversations for two main reasons. Firstly, although transitional justice 
is firmly established as a core component of efforts to overcome violence and fragility, it remains 
undertheorized in relation to interrogating the forms of democracy that should be pursued in the 
transitional period and addressing the socio-economic harms that may be causes or consequences of 
conflict and repression.
Secondly, interdisciplinary academic literature has recognized for several years that many political 
transitions stall or face reversals. In recent years, there has been growing awareness that even in 
some consolidated democracies, the quality of democracy is eroding. In response to these challenges, 
democratization scholars increasingly emphasize the need to build legitimate governance through 
inclusive participation and there is growing scrutiny of the risks posed to democratization by 
economic policies that increase inequality and may enable elites to capture economic and political 
institutions. However, transitional justice has been slow to incorporate such insights from other 
fields, and there has been very limited empirical research on how economic conditions, interests, 
and ideologies can shape transitional states’ efforts to address past injustices and build stable and 
legitimate governments. This workshop explored these gaps within the literature.
The key themes that emerged from the workshop include:
•	 Empirical data from some of the case study sites discussed indicates that where the adoption of 
some economically liberal approaches has led to economic growth, this has not resulted in greater 
democratic liberalism, or even the creation of competitive liberal economies. Instead, particularly 
in less democratic societies, where measures related to economic liberalism are implemented, 
they can enable political and business elites to capture or consolidate their control of economic 
and political institutions. This may particularly arise where the regime seeks to legitimize itself on 
the need to maintain political stability in order to provide an optimum environment for economic 
growth and foreign investment. In such contexts, the consolidation of power in a group of elites, 
may result in the need for stability being used to justify illiberal policies, including suppressing 
democratic opposition, restricting the media, and using violent repression.
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•	 Elite capture of institutions may increase their capacity to select and shape transitional justice 
policies to promote their preferred narratives of past violence and to ensure that their exposure to 
criminal liability is restricted.
•	 Technocratic and legalistic approaches to policymaking often obscure or overlook national and 
international politics inherent in policy formation and implementation. Given that decisions on 
the design of transitional justice policies may be driven by the self-interests of elite actors, as 
well as by economic or other ideologies, and contextual factors, it is insufficient to approach 
policymaking in this realm as a technical and depoliticized issue. It is important to engage with the 
politics to understand why policies are adopted and to better understand what works and does 
not work in supporting progress in transitional societies. This should entail engaging with political 
economy questions of who selects and shapes the design of transitional justice mechanisms and 
why. This analysis should also consider the extent to which there is transparency and stakeholder 
consultation in transitional justice policymaking.
•	 Among the case study countries, corruption was repeatedly highlighted as a cause of violence, a 
motivator for elite capture of institutions, and an inhibitor of democratic consolidation.
•	 Inequality was also characterized across the case study countries as a trigger for political 
instability and a factor that undermines national cohesion, particularly where geographic regions 
or minority groups suffer inequality disproportionately. It was repeatedly observed that economic 
policies that do not take redistribution into account often exacerbate inequalities.
•	 The legacy of colonialism was also pointed to as a driver for violence and repression in 
post-colonial societies. These arguments highlighted in particular how repressive colonial practices 
have endured within institutions, particularly security apparatus, and how insufficient attention 
has been paid to addressing trauma and cultures of violence that colonialism created. These 
observations relate to a larger point that was made that economic conditions and structures in 
the pre-transition phase may prove difficult to alter, even in situations of fundamental political 
transition/regime change.
•	 At the more theoretical level, the workshop explored how within academic literature and public 
discourse, there is often contestation over key concepts relating to the workshop themes. For 
example, liberalism is conflated with neoliberalism, but this overlooks that liberalism can take 
many forms. Broader understandings of liberalism have scope for approaches that allow for 
inclusion, tolerance, participation, self-determination, subsidiarity, pluralism, and more equitable 
social and economic conditions. Acknowledging the multiplicity of forms that liberalism can take 
allows for greater flexibility in addressing questions of governance and economic recovery in 
transitional societies, and may provide greater scope for transitional justice to address the root 
causes of conflict.
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•	 There is no single, right model for economic recovery in fragile and transitional states. Among the 
workshop participants, there were divergent views on whether economic liberalism, understood 
as purely market-orientated economic policies, is the appropriate model for transitional states. 
However, there was consensus that there are different models of economic liberalism and that 
some may be better suited to the challenges faced by transitional states. There was consensus 
among participants that whatever model is adopted, it should be orientated towards political and 
economic inclusivity.
•	 Institution building is fundamental to ensuring that societies are able to transition successfully. 
Experience so far has demonstrated that it is a long-term process and merely trying to replicate 
Western institutions in other contexts is rarely successful. Theory today acknowledges that 
there is no clear set of blueprints for institution building. However, most academic literature 
and international policy papers emphasize the importance of creating transparent, inclusive, 
accountable, and independent institutions with clear mandates. The workshop participants noted 
that practice has not yet evolved on how this should be achieved.
To facilitate free discussion, the meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule, which states 
‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use 
the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any 
other participant, may be revealed’. This report therefore does not attribute any remarks to individual 
participants, but it provides a general summary of discussions for a wider audience.
This report firstly summarizes the workshop’s two thematic panels before outlining the presentations 
and discussions from the case study sessions.
1 Chatham House, ‘Chatham House Rule’ chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule?gclid=Cj0KCQiAiKrUBRD6ARIsADS2OLnjdlq-
Frcf23Z1v4FnXJ4khAi1Ce8w2SEVWEsh--H5u-hQhEqU8SWQaAuwwEALw_wcB (accessed 27 March 2018).
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Key Concepts, Questions, Methodologies, and 
the Limits of Existing Theory
During the workshop, five speakers delivered thematic presentations across two sessions. These 
presentations covered diverse, yet complementary areas of research and practice. This section 
summarizes each of the presentations in turn before presenting the main issues to arise in the 
group discussions.
The first thematic presentation began by providing a conceptual analysis of economic liberalism and 
neoliberalism. It observed that neoliberalism is a conceptually contested term, as understandings of 
it vary considerably between academic disciplines, and a politically contested term in that it is used 
more often by critics of particular economic policies than by neoliberalism’s ‘alleged adherents’. In 
contrast, the speaker argued that economic liberalism is more a conceptually coherent economic 
ideology. The speaker then stated that its key features include: prioritizing the market over the 
state; encouraging privatization of (most) state-owned enterprises; liberalizing trade, investment 
and finance policies; only lightly regulating most industries; being sceptical of high public debt; and 
emphasizing the importance of property rights, the rule of law, and contract rights. The speaker 
noted that economic liberalism was generally supportive of austerity policies to reduce public debt.
The speaker then contended that if economic liberalism is one potential model for reforming the 
economies in fragile states, two other liberal models are possible. One model could retain most 
aspects of economic liberalism whilst also allowing a larger role for the state in setting industrial 
policies, intervening in the markets, and owning some industries. However, the speaker cautioned that 
applying this model to transitional settings could be challenging where the state is too weak to have 
effective, efficient oversight of the market; or where widespread corruption and cronyism could be 
particularly problematic if there are large state-owned enterprises.
A second alternative model could be greater reliance on existing informal norms, collectivism, and 
local practices. The speaker gave the example of where there are well-functioning land cooperatives 
it may make little sense to intervene and divide the land into individually owned farms. This has 
the advantage of building on what works, but in transitional settings, pre-existing social institutions 
and norms may be problematic and, for example, may reinforce discrimination against women and 
minority groups.
The final section of the first speaker’s presentation focused on what works in economic recovery. 
Here, the speaker contended that we know more about what does not work than what works. The 
presentation referred to ‘shock therapy’ approaches, namely rapid and widespread programmes to 
remove the state from the economy, as measures that do not produce economic recovery. It was
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contended that these approaches have fallen out of favour as it is now widely recognized that 
well-functioning institutions are necessary for the proper operations of markets. The speaker further 
contended that the main approach to economic recovery today is institution building. However, 
returning to the theme of what does not work, the presenter cautioned against ‘isomorphic mimicry’, 
namely the practice of trying to replicate Western style institutions in transitional settings,2 which 
often results in the establishment of institutions that look like institutions in the West but are unable 
to carry out their functions. In presenting examples of failed efforts of institution building, the 
speaker also highlighted the challenge of when laws exist on paper but not in practice.
In exploring the limited evidence that exists for what does work in economic recovery, the speaker 
referred to the 2011 World Bank report3 that highlighted the importance of jobs, security, and 
justice in preventing relapses into conflict, but the speaker argued that these observations are 
difficult to operationalize into policy terms. The presentation then drew upon the work of Andrews, 
Pritchett, and Woolcock to argue for ‘problem-driven iterative adaptation’.4 This approach eschews 
addressing a context with a set model or set institutions to replicate, and instead calls for more 
bottom-up approaches that allow local communities to nominate their own problems, to exercise 
decision-making power to come up with their own solutions, and to encourage experimentation 
and feedback to ensure the solutions work. The one thing that can be said definitively that is true is 
that institution building is a slow, messy process and there is no clear set of blueprints. The speaker 
concluded that there is no single, right model for economic recovery in fragile states.
The second thematic presentation began by emphasizing that the research agenda underpinning the 
workshop is intended to deal with real world problems and have a policy impact; it is not simply an 
academic exercise. On this basis, the speaker argued that the project should engage with the United 
Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (also referred to as the 2030 Agenda),5 as these were 
produced in the real world and progress towards their fulfilment can be measured. However, the 
speaker cautioned that state or national level measures might not always reveal local inequalities 
within states.
A major theme running through the second presentation was that politics presents a significant 
challenge to the implementation of the SDGs. In exploring this theme, the speaker highlighted both 
international trends such as the democratic recession around the world, which undermines the extent 
to which international actors will work together with the same positive objectives in mind to fulfil the 
SDGs, as well as national political dynamics, such as elite capture of transitional processes. The 
2 In making this argument, the speaker referenced Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock, Building State Capacity: 
Evidence, Analysis, Action (Oxford University Press 2017).
3  World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (World Bank, Washington DC, 2011).
4  Andrews, Pritchett & Woolcook (n 2).
5  UNDP, Sustainable Development Goals undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html (accessed 20 February 
2018).
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speaker contrasted this assertion of the importance of politics with neoliberalism, which it was argued 
seeks to depoliticize responses to intensely political issues. The speaker contended that it is important 
to think about the political dimensions of development, as the problem is not a lack of resources 
or a lack of knowledge about what works. Instead, the problem fundamentally is how to deal with 
the political challenges that are faced in different countries, in particular, where certain groups are 
able to dominate or capture the transitional process for their own purposes. The speaker argued that 
neoliberalism does not face up to these challenges. The overlooking or obscuring of political issues 
can create a difficult climate for practitioners who seek to reveal the role of power and politics in 
policymaking and to focus on what is going wrong in transitional societies, as they may come up 
against strong vested interests. Nonetheless, the speaker contended that it is not possible to look at 
how to achieve progress in transitional states in a narrow economic sense or as a technical exercise, it 
is important to recognize the politics of it. The presenter argued that projects such as TJI’s Economic 
Liberalism, Democracy, and Transitional Justice project, can ask questions that others cannot ask 
because of the sensitivities. As a result, such projects have the potential to make a real contribution to 
understanding the importance and dynamics of the resistance against the fulfilment of the SDGs.
The second presenter argued that meeting the challenges outlined in this presentation requires 
bringing together people with diverse backgrounds. It was further argued that multidisciplinary 
scholars play an important role in developing models to measure progress, but that academics 
have limited familiarity with political processes and the dynamics of negotiations. Therefore, a 
cross-fertilization of knowledge between academics and practitioners is the best methodology to 
grapple with the issues explored in the workshop.
The third thematic speaker moved the discussion from exploring larger conceptual issues to focusing 
more directly on questions of political economy in transitional justice. A number of observations 
framed the analysis. Firstly, it was noted intra-state conflict is now the predominant source of 
violence around the world. Secondly, drawing on findings of a joint UN World Bank study on conflict 
prevention,6 it was argued that the primary driver of intra-state conflict is social group specific 
grievances. Following from this observation, the speaker then contended that political elites may seek 
to select and design transitional justice processes in order to bolster their own preferred narrative 
of the conflict, which would generally see combatants from their own group as the ‘good guys’ and 
combatants from the other group(s) as bad. Similarly, only victims from their own group would be 
recognized as deserving, whereas the victimhood of persons from the other group(s) would be denied 
or downplayed.
Flowing from these observations, the main argument of this presentation was that rather than taking 
a more generic, ideological approach to economic liberalism, it is important to ask political economy
6  World Bank Group and United Nations, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict (2018 International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank) openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337 (accessed 27 March 
2018).
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questions such as who selected and designed transitional justice institutions and why? Which civil 
society actors participate in transitional justice processes and how does this shape the outcomes? The 
speaker contended that without asking such questions, transitional justice processes run the risk of 
embedding and deepening the very same social group specific grievances that bring about conflict. To 
address these questions, the speaker welcomed the theoretical frameworks put forward in the World 
Bank’s 20117 and 2017 Development Reports, which call for more bottom-up, iterative approaches. 
However, it was noted that these reports give little indication of how these frameworks should be 
implemented in practice.
To address the question of how transitional justice programmes are and should be designed, the 
speaker referred to SDG 10.28 and SDG 16.79 to emphasize the importance of responsive, inclusive, 
participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels. 
The speaker also argued that an important element in the design of transitional justice processes 
should be to draw up ‘historically demonstrated, credible methodologies’ used by UN Commissions 
of Inquiry and international non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, to identify a ‘credibly alleged universe of victims’. It was contended that this 
could be used to inform the selection and design of transitional justice processes in ways that are less 
vulnerable to local political and civil society actors seeking to shape the jurisdictional10 and functional11 
variables of these transitional justice processes to direct them away from themselves and towards 
their political adversaries. The speaker emphasized that to expose and reduce political manipulation 
of transitional justice mechanisms, specific attention should be paid the mechanisms’ jurisdictional 
and functional elements. 
Finally, the speaker contended that with respect to the role of commercial actors, whose 
interventions are often overlooked although they can play a decisive role in deepening and prolonging 
intra-state conflicts, ensuring that the jurisdictional elements of transitional justice mechanisms 
extend liability to those who aided and abetted serious crimes may be important. It may also been 
necessary to explore how commercial actors influence the functional elements of a transitional 
justice mechanism.
7 World Bank (n 6).
8 SDG 10.2: ‘By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, 
ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status.’
9 SDG 16.7: ‘Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels’
10 Eg, subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, relationship to national courts, precision of criminal conduct, territorial 
jurisdiction, temporal jurisdiction, the extent which civilians, NGOs, governments and investigators are able to trigger investigations, and 
case selection criteria.
11 Eg capacity to compel cooperation, investigative access to territory, access to and protection of witnesses, provision of information 
and evidence, fiscal independence, personnel provision/appointments process, process location, and apprehension and surrender of the 
accused.
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The fourth thematic speaker moved the discussion from thinking about universal concepts and 
approaches towards a regional analysis of the relationship of economic liberalism to post-conflict, 
democratic, and developmental transitions in conflict-afflicted Arab countries. The presentation 
took a chronological approach beginning with the autocratic governments before the Arab Spring. It 
was emphasized that indicators such as Polity IV make clear that the Arab region has been the least 
democratized world region; but it is also a region with impressive economic development. From this, 
the speaker concluded that in the Arab World, there is a non-correlation between democracy and 
development. Scholars have labelled this gap ‘Arab Exceptionalism’ as it differs from the positive 
relationship between democracy and development in other world regions (however, the speaker noted 
that even within other regions, some individual countries experience the same non-correlation).
The speaker then presented findings from a cross-country analysis12 that asked why Arab 
Exceptionalism exists. It was argued that cultural and religious factors do not provide an explanation. 
Instead, the speaker put forward two dominant explanatory factors. First, abundant oil reserves, 
which were found before democratization in the Arab region and which provide non-democratic 
regimes with resources to trade public goods and economic benefits against political participation 
rights, to spend lavishly on security and military infrastructure, and to privilege particular social 
groups. Second, multiple, multi-faceted conflicts, including the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, 
disruptive foreign interventions, and the growth of fundamentalist groups, undermine the growth of 
the democracy. The speaker noted that the impact of these factors varied between countries within 
the region.
Turning to economic liberalism, the speaker argued that there had been limited economic liberalism 
under the region’s non-democratic regimes, such as privatization of certain enterprises, reductions 
in state subsidies, and trade openness. It was stated that these economic liberalism measures were 
not introduced out of conviction that they were more efficient. Instead, they were implemented 
because the regimes thought that they would perpetuate their own existence. They were self-defence 
measures, where the autocratic regimes were faced with rising public debts, growing fiscal deficits, 
mounting balance of payment pressures, and pressure from international financial institutions. The 
speaker argued that these measures did not result in the creation of competitive liberal economies. 
Instead, they led to capture of national economies by political and business elites.
The presentation then turned to explanatory factors underlying the 2011 uprisings. The speaker 
argued that increases in rates of unemployment to the highest levels of the world, especially among 
young people, were a dominant factor. To a lesser extent, growing economic inequality may also have 
played a role, particularly after the process of privatization of the national economy started to take 
hold in these countries, although this issue is controversial in the literature. Other non-economic
12 I. Elbadawi and S. Makdisi, (eds), Democratic Transitions in the Arab World (Cambridge University Press 2017).
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factors include population growth, increasing literacy and digital connectness among young people, 
feeble rule of law and property rights, and long-standing frustrated aspirations for greater political 
freedoms.
The speaker then asked what should replace the overthrown political-economic regimes. It was 
argued that given that flawed institutions were a driver of the uprisings, a primary objective should be 
changing or entirely replacing the institutional fabric of the country, with institutions that are capable 
of providing transparent, predictable policies, with clear mandates, easy to monitor, and non-arbitrary 
decision making, and which are independent from political inference and elite capture. In addition, to 
creating new institutions, the speaker argued that reconstruction also requires nation building, which 
was characterized as the forging of a sense of common nationhood, intended to overcome ethnic, 
sectarian, or communal differences; to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty. To achieve 
this, the speaker asserted that the transitional model must be both politically and economically 
inclusive. The presenter continued that, economic liberalism, understood as the mainstay of purely 
market-oriented economic policies, is not the model for transition whatever liberal democracy may 
or may not imply in this regard. Instead, the speaker concluded that reconstruction in the Arab World 
requires the creation of genuine democracy and the implementation of macro- and micro-economic 
policy that reconciles the objectives of growth and socio-economic equity while allowing for the full 
potential of the private sector as an engine of growth. 
The final thematic presentation focused more directly on transitional justice and explored its 
relationship to neoliberalism. It began by focusing on economic violence, which was defined as 
violations of economic and social rights, plunder of natural resources, corruption and other economic 
crimes, and some international humanitarian law violations (eg forced displacement, starvation, 
destruction of property). The presenter argued that economic violence is an elastic concept that could 
also potentially include structural adjustment policies and shock therapy. The speaker continued that 
whereas Galtung argued that structural violence can be less intentional and less direct than physical 
violence, economic violence is often intentional and direct. Where this is the case, the speaker 
advocated that transitional justice should address structural violence in a similar manner to physical 
violence. However, it was observed that this rarely occurs.
The speaker then turned to exploring why transitional justice mechanisms are often focused only on 
physical violence. It was argued that implicit in transitional justice’s evolution is the liberal peace thesis 
that free markets plus procedural democracy will equal peace. The speaker also argued that much of 
the intellectual capital that infused the transitional justice field’s early development came from the 
human rights community in the United States, which privileged civil and political rights and pressed 
for justice for atrocity crimes, but did not view economic and social rights as legally enforceable. In 
addition to factors tied to neoliberalism, the speaker noted that other contributory factors include 
the dominance of lawyers within the transitional justice community and the privileging of their 
knowledge and expertise.
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The speaker was careful to note that this does not mean that transitional justice is part of a 
conspiracy but contended instead that it reflects the ideology and assumptions that transcend it and 
its dominant preoccupations reflect neoliberal ideology and the public international law more broadly. 
As a result, it was argued that transitional justice emphasizes ideas that are Western, modern, secular, 
or legal over approaches that are non-Western, religious, local, traditional, or political. Transitional 
justice prioritizes civil and political rights, particularly physical violence, over economic and social 
rights and structural violence. It calls for retributive justice, rather than distributive justice. As a result, 
the speaker suggests that the deep-seated assumptions of transitional justice may not be helpful for 
addressing the root causes of violence.
The speaker’s final remarks stated in many of the critiques, liberalism is conflated with neoliberalism. 
However, it was argued that liberalism is a big tent and there is pluralism in the different models 
of democratization and marketization in different societies. The speaker asked how can ‘economic 
liberalism’ encompass both the Washington Consensus and the China model? How can liberalism 
include both Paul Ryan’s libertarian fantasies and the Scandinavian social democratic model? The 
presenter further contended that the liberal tradition provides ample room for giving greater weight 
to inclusion, tolerance, participation, self-determination, subsidiarity, pluralism, and more equitable 
social and economic conditions. The speaker concluded by arguing that within a framework in which 
it is accepted that there can be multiple forms of liberal peace, transitional justice can play a role as a 
form of peacebuilding that is contextually tailored to addressing particular root causes and drivers of 
conflicts.
The thematic presentations prompted much rich discussion among the workshop participants. The 
main themes that arose were:
•	 The significance of the shifting global economic order: among the points raised on this theme 
were reflections on the meaning of the term ‘Washington Consensus’, with one participant noting 
that what is commonly termed as the Washington Consensus with respect to the preferred 
economic policies promoted by the United States in the early 1990s is closer to what is commonly 
described today as neoliberalism. However, the consensus in Washington that has evolved since 
the 1990s, today recognizes a greater role for the state and is consequently less clearly tied to 
neoliberalism. Elsewhere in the discussion, the Washington Consensus was contrasted with the 
Beijing Consensus, which it was argued had also evolved over a number of years. One speaker 
noted that ten years ago, the Beijing Consensus was talked about as a new model that had more 
scope for industrial policies and state-led development (although it was noted that many Asian 
countries had implemented similar approaches for decades). Today, discussions of China’s role in 
the global economic order are often less ideological in the sense that its approach is less often 
discussed a model; instead, its role is now considered more commonly in a power-based, interest 
sense. This views China as alternate source of financing and political patronage that shifts the
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 global distribution of power in ways that change the models that different countries might 
want to use. It was argued that although less progressive or developed countries might be more 
sensitive to Chinese pressure, even more progressive countries are changing their approaches 
based on the growth of the China’s economic power. It was argued that these global shifts are 
already shaping the pursuit of international criminal justice as the example of Syria shows that 
Russia and China are prepared to work together to block UN Security Council referrals of situations 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
•	 Importance of power and politics: several participants in the workshop emphasized the 
importance of looking at power relationships, and some argued that they are more significant 
than economics and global norms, although they are often overlooked in the literature. 
One speaker noted that the theory of economic liberalism is not the problem, the problem 
is to explain how it works in practice, and in particular, how elites operate using economic 
liberalism. Participants similarly observed that power and politics may shape transitional justice 
policymaking and implementation. It was argued that more research is needed to explore who 
decides to create transitional justice mechanisms, who determines what these mechanisms can 
investigate and what powers they can exercise, and who funds these institutions and ensures 
they that can function appropriately. It was argued that these issues are often central to the 
effectiveness of transitional justice processes in leading to peace, democracy, and the rule of law. 
The participants cited many examples to show how power and politics had influenced where 
international courts had been created and where they had not, and where they had been created, 
the crimes that fell within their jurisdiction. It was also argued that the focus within transitional 
justice and international criminal law on the consequences of violence, but not the causes was 
similarly a product of power relationships. A similar argument was made with respect to the 
focus on prosecuting those who are deemed most responsible for ordering or perpetrating acts of 
violence, whilst overlooking the role of powerful actors who aid and abet repressive regimes and 
non-state armed groups.
•	 Property rights: the participants made a number of observations on this theme. One suggested 
that property rights and the rule of law should not be viewed just as elements of economic 
liberalism as even if it is decided that the solution for post-conflict transitions is more inclusive 
development models, property rights and the rule of law are likely to be part of any such models. 
Another participant noted that in most economic systems, having some form of property 
rights and the rule of law would lead to better economic outcomes. The question is how do 
you operationalize that? In exploring this further, the participant questioned whether legally 
enforceable land deeds would function well in all contexts. It was suggested that it is possible 
to imagine a world where property rights are enforced more informally through social pressures 
and local collective decision-making that would still embrace the importance of property rights 
as an abstract theoretical element of economic growth but would not have the same replication 
questions. A third participant noted the risk that powerful actors capture and mangle property
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 rights. This observation was tied to the notion of lawfare where the use of law is taken as an 
asymmetric exercise of power where the powerful use law to silence their opponents. Another 
participant noted that lawfare can occur in contexts where on the surface everybody has equal 
access to the law, but in reality the system operates in a manner that ensures that certain people 
can enforce their rights far more easily than others.
•	 Empirical validation and the importance of measurement: several participants argued that 
academic literature in general, and particular in relation to transitional justice, is far too often 
based on theoretical assumptions and normative judgments with little empirical grounding. It 
was suggested that this was in part due to the fact that academics sometimes write about case 
studies based on publications and lectures rather than detailed local knowledge. It was further 
contended that with respect to governance and justice, even where scholars and practitioners 
have sought to conduct empirical measurements these have often focused on outputs rather 
than outcomes, as the former are easier to measure than the latter. It was contended that such 
exercises run the risk of not measuring what is really important and could have distorting results.
•	 Role of civil society: one participant noted that civil society is an important element of a 
developed society and that it can play a significant role in many areas including the pursuit of 
justice. However, it was argued there is a reduction in the role of civil society in many contexts 
due to funding cuts, co-option of civil society personnel into government, or conversely, state 
intimidation of civil society activists.
•	 Elite fragmentation and democracy: one participant used the example of post-Suharto Indonesia 
to argue that elite fragmentation can create space to make democratization possible. In contrast, 
it was argued that where elites are united, it becomes easier for them to capture resources, 
institutions, and processes.
•	 The importance of political-sensitive terminology: one participant argued for the potential 
of linking the 2030 Agenda to the workshop’s broader debate on the relationships between 
transitional justice, democracy, and economic liberalism. It was noted that the SDGs are 
formulated in ways that are not frightening to repressive governments as they do not talk about 




The session on Cambodia had two presentations with interlinked themes. The first speaker 
presented an overview of Cambodia’s political history since the 1970s. The second speaker used 
Cambodia as a case study to evaluate theoretical assumptions on the extent that neoliberal 
approaches can contribute to sustainable peace.
The first speaker opened their presentation with an overview of the modern historical context, 
arguing that Cambodia has endured a long history of oppression marked by colonial occupation and 
foreign intervention. The speaker noted that between 1965 and 1973, the United States as part of 
its wider regional campaign to fight communism in Vietnam, dropped 2.7 million tonnes of bombs 
on Cambodia. This exceeds the amount of bombs America dropped on Japan during World War II by 
almost a million tonnes.
From 1975, after Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge, the population was subjected to a radical plan 
to forcibly return Cambodia’s economy and society to an agrarian one. The presenter said that two 
million people were evacuated from Phnom Penh in three days, on the pretext of avoiding American 
bombs. In the mass exodus to the countryside and subsequent repression under the Khmer Rouge 
regime, a quarter of the population died and thousands were tortured.
In 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and ousted the Khmer Rouge pushing them across the border 
into Thailand. The speaker noted that little was done to challenge the Vietnamese occupation until 
after the end of the Cold War. In 1989, under international pressure, the Vietnamese withdrew and 
in 1991, the Comprehensive Cambodian Peace Agreement (or Paris Agreement) was signed by 
Cambodia and 18 other nations in the presence of the UN.
In 1992, the UN established its Transitional Administration in Cambodia, which had an 
unprecedentedly broad mandate. This included deploying a large peacekeeping force to provide the 
security needed to put in place democratic processes, in particular to enable elections to take place. 
The speaker noted that during its two years of operations, the mission developed a reputation for 
achieving very little that was positive and for a pervasive and deep-rooted predilection for sexual 
exploitation and abuse. 
Elections were held in 1993. However, the speaker argued that their democratic aspect was 
undermined as despite a clear win by the Royalist party, FUNCINPEC, led by Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh, under the peace agreement, the party was required to form a coalition with the 
Cambodian People’s Party, led by Hun Sen. In 1997, Hun Sen ousted his co-premier Norodom 
Ranariddh. This resulted in a suspension of foreign aid, though not of foreign income, since China
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stepped in to fill the gap. It also delayed Cambodia’s entry into the ASEAN community, which took 
place in 1999.
The speaker then discussed Cambodia’s astonishingly successful economic development programme, 
which has resulted in an average of seven per cent growth in GDP every year for the last decade. At 
the same time, the level of aid received by Cambodia, which initially was extremely high, has dropped 
dramatically. For example, foreign aid as percentage of government income dropped from 120 per 
cent to 32 per cent between 2002 and 2015. However, this speaker argued that the distribution of 
the benefits of this economic success has been very unequal and maternal mortality has increased. 
In this speaker’s opinion, power balances resulting from unequal distribution in a successful economy 
facilitate corruption in business and politics. The speaker contended that corruption has become 
an integral part of Cambodia’s economic and political system. This has contributed to greater 
centralization of power and oligarchic control. The same prime minister has been in power for 33 
years, which provides political stability but it indicates the very limited progress Cambodia has made 
towards democracy building. The speaker suggested that democracy in Cambodia is regressing and 
arguably has died. To illustrate this, the presenter noted that in 2017 one of only two independent 
newspapers was shut down, the opposition leader was arrested, and independent radio stations 
were closed down. In the speaker’s view, a form of ‘lawfare’ has been used to de-legitimize opposition 
through new regulations and new laws.
The second presentation began by setting out a theoretical framework, which the speaker viewed as 
underpinning the neoliberal normative arguments. This framework consisted of a triple process that it 
is assumed will contribute to peace:
•	 Economic liberalism = marketization to achieve peace through prosperity
•	 Political liberalism = democratization through transition and consolidation
•	 Legal liberalism = criminalization of political violence through formal trials
The speaker then analysed this framework in general terms, noting, for example, that marketization 
may lead to economic growth and wealth creation, but it generally also contributes to widening 
inequalities. It was further argued that imposing this framework in illiberal contexts may not achieve 
the designed results when genuine democracy fails to take hold and where elites manipulate the 
criminal justice process to consolidate their hold own power.
In the remainder of the presentation, the speaker applied this framework to Cambodian experiences 
from the fall of the Khmer Rouge to the present day. With respect to economic liberalism, the 
speaker noted that the economic benefits of the policies adopted in Cambodia have been huge: 
some years ago, 50 per cent of the population was below the poverty line (the minimum level of 
income considered adequate) whereas by 2014 the figure was 14 per cent according to the Asian 
Development Bank. However, inequality in income levels persists. The speaker then argued with
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respect to political liberalism, progress towards democracy has been poor. In the speaker’s view, 
Cambodia is not free; it is an illiberal democracy. Finally, with respect to legal liberalism, the speaker 
noted that the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was created in 2003 
to try Khmer Rouge leaders. However, the speaker observed that peace between the Cambodian 
government and the Khmer Rouge had been secured by amnesties for most Khmer Rouge members 
and today, the national criminal justice process remains a tool of the ruling party. To illustrate this 
latter point, the presentation referred to the 2015 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (an 
analysis of states’ record on meeting rule of law standards), which ranked Cambodia at 99 out of 102 
countries. In 2016, this had dropped to 112 out of 113.
Based on these trends, the speaker concluded that the neoliberal assumptions that the triple process 
leads to prosperity, peace, and justice have some theoretical and empirical merit. Conditions in 
Cambodia have improved considerably compared to the prior rates of war, violence, and poverty. 
However, the speaker also contended that Cambodia’s experience demonstrates the limits or even 
dangers of neoliberalism when applied to war-torn or post-war countries where asymmetrical power 
relations and the perception of insecurity persist, where state and civil society institutions remain 
fragile or extremely weak, all of which give rise to or perpetuate the politics of survival. In particular, 
the speaker said that in Cambodia the fact that the economy grew, and continues to grow, legitimizes 
the existing regime. The legitimization is strengthened by the belief that in order to have economic 
growth it is necessary to have political stability. On this basis, protests must be suppressed because 
they will lead to political instability, which in turn will result in economic problems.
The speaker said that when the UN established a transitional government in Cambodia, it was 
assumed that Cambodians would work together and compete for political power peacefully: but very 
little attention was paid to how ‘power’, including who holds it and how it is used, might affect this 
process. Once the peace agreement was signed in 1991, the temporary alliance opposing Hun Sen 
gradually disintegrated leaving his Cambodian People’s Party free to become the dominant party and 
suppress opposition. In this speaker’s opinion, the problem has been exacerbated by the efforts of the 
ruling party to politicize the judicial and legal system in order to protect its leaders from the possibility 
of prosecution in the ECCC for genocide and crimes against humanity. This speaker concluded that 
in Cambodia, elite power in conjunction with their insecurity (particularly their fear of prosecution) 
has driven oppression and subversion of the rule of law. Hence, although the economy has improved 
dramatically, progress on transitional justice issues has been stultified.
Following the presentations, the workshop participants discussed a number of themes:
•	 Absence of a correlation between growth and democratization, at least in East Asia: one 
participant stated that the absence of a correlation occurred as economic power comes with 
political power: the more money someone has, the more they can influence an election. A second 
factor is that economic growth gives a regime legitimacy: if the country is doing well, people tend
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 to accept that the regime in power is entitled to govern and do not raise objections if it uses 
undemocratic methods of crushing opposition because political stability is seen as essential to 
economic growth. It was observed that many critical scholars argue that market liberalization 
leads to a weakening of the state: but one participant suggested that in East Asia the opposite is 
true. The East Asian economic model depends on the state having a powerful role – a difference 
reflected in the move from the ‘Washington consensus’ to the ‘Beijing consensus.’
•	 Privileging of political stability, economic growth, and market-oriented economics over 
democracy and justice: it was noted that in both Cambodia and Haiti political stability, economic 
growth, and an export-oriented market, have been prized and protected at the expense of 
democracy and justice. It was pointed out that business leaders in Haiti were unconcerned by 
the absence of a robust rule of law system as their economic initiatives may be expedited in its 
absence as all that is required is money and contacts. The participants observed that in Cambodia 
the primary concern of investors is not to promote the rule of law, but to ensure stability. Illiberal 
regimes justify political repression by arguing that they are promoting stability to ensure that 
foreign investors are not scared away. The participants further noted that China is the number 
one investor in Cambodia and it is not concerned with the rule of law so long as its investments 
are profitable.
•	 Corruption: one participant suggested that corruption helps fuel economic growth: money 
laundering brings money into the country that is then invested. Another participant responded 
that to some extent this may be true, but only if the corruption is limited. If the scale of 
corruption becomes too much, not enough of the money coming in will end up in hands of the 
productive side of the economy.
•	 The extent to which Cambodia’s rapid economic growth benefited employees: it was stated 
that the benefits to employees were limited because investors were attracted to economies in 
which labour costs are low. Benefits would only accrue to factory workers if the opposition parties 
pushed for higher wages and labour rights. In Cambodia, this does not happen, since the priority is 
political stability and economic growth, not democracy. However, another participant noted that 
in response to pressure from the United States in the 1990s for higher standards as a condition of 
trade, labour conditions and wages had improved. This participant suggested that since Cambodia 
joined the World Trade Organization in 2004, its factories are no longer being named and shamed 
for poor labour conditions in the same way that they used to be. In addition, this participant 
noted that wages increased in 2017 in response to political pressure from opposition parties.
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Chile
The session on Chile had two presentations that complemented each other in analysing 
Chile’s past and present. The first provided a historical overview of the linkages between the 
military regime of Augusto Pinochet and neoliberal economic policies. The second focused on 
contemporary attitudes to democracy within Chile.
The first presentation began by noting that Chile’s ‘neoliberal experiment’ was one of the first 
laboratories for what became known as neoliberal economic policies. As a result, it has been 
extensively explored in academic literature and popular culture. The speaker started telling the story 
of this experiment with the 1970 election of President Salvador Allende, who had a mandate to move 
Chile towards socialism through democratic means. The speaker noted that the Allende government’s 
economic policies included gradually moving towards public ownership of economy, redistribution 
through increasing salaries and public expenditure, introducing high trade barriers, and price controls. 
The speaker noted that these policies resulted in growth and rising wages between 1970 and 1972, 
but then the economy collapsed dramatically. The collapse resulted in hyperinflation, the draining of 
foreign reserves, falls in GDP and real wages, shortages of basic commodities, and widespread public 
disorder on the streets of Chile. The speaker noted that the military used both the deterioration in the 
rule of law and the economic collapse to justify seizing power in a 1973 coup, backed by the CIA (the 
United States’ foreign intelligence service).
Once the military were in power, they engaged in a brutal and systematic programme of suppressing 
their perceived political opponents, including enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, 
arbitrary detentions, and torture. The presentation referred to the work of Javier Couso, who argued 
that Chile’s neoliberal experiment, which was launched in 1975, ‘could be implemented only under the 
context of a dictatorship in which the most fundamental liberties were severely curtailed’.13
The presentation noted that neoliberalism in Chile began with the appointment of the ‘Chicago 
Boys’ in 1975. This term refers to a group of Chilean economists who had been educated in the 
United States and were heavily influenced by the work of Milton Friedman and other scholars from 
the Chicago School of Economics. The speaker argued that the Chicago Boys shared the military’s 
goals of fighting Communism and economic stagnation through a technocratic regime that would 
avoid demagogic and inefficient economic policies, which they saw as resulting from the way that 
democracy operated in Chile. It was further argued that authoritarianism allowed the Chicago Boys 
to exercise exceptional autonomy in designing economic and social policy and that between 1975 
and 1982, they used this autonomy to introduce a ‘shock therapy’ programme. This entailed rapid and 
widespread measures to transform Chile into a liberalized, world-integrated economy in which market 
forces were left free to guide most of the economy’s decisions and the government’s scope 
13 Javier Couso, ‘Trying Democracy in the Shadow of Authoritarian Legality: Chile’s Transition to Democracy and Pinochet’s Constitution 
of 1980’ (2012) 29(2) Wisconsin International Law Journal 393.
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for economic intervention was substantially curtailed. Measures introduced under this programme 
included privatizing land and industry, abolishing price controls, liberalizing imports, deregulating 
financial market and capital flows, suppressing trade unions, and changing welfare provisions.
In exploring the consequences of the Chicago Boys’ programmes, the speaker noted that policies 
initially generated an economic recovery in 1979 and 1980, which created an impression that the 
military regime was economically competent. The speaker suggested that this impression was a 
factor in the military winning a 1980 referendum on the adoption of a new constitution, which was 
designed to embed authoritarian features into Chilean governance on a permanent bias. The speaker 
noted that the military had timed the referendum well as by 1982, the Chilean economy faced 
another crisis, which was characterized by high levels of indebtedness and growing inequality. The 
crisis triggered a wave of public demonstrations against military rule. Business elites simultaneously 
began to pressure the military to change their economic policies. The military responded to these 
pressures by replacing the Chicago Boys’ neoliberalism, with more pragmatic economic policies. 
However, these policies were biased towards wealthier parts of Chilean society and inequalities 
continued to grow. The military also continued to maintain its tough position towards labour and 
grassroots organizations and opposition political parties. However, these groups were able to organize, 
which resulted in the military’s defeat in a 1988 plebiscite, and the holding of democratic elections in 
1989.
The speaker’s final remarks reflected briefly on the democratic period. It was observed that although 
the left-wing coalition that governed Chile from 1990 to 2010 (and is again currently in power) 
introduced some measures designed to ensure greater redistribution, by and large, neoliberal policies 
were accepted by the left and right wings of the political spectrum in Chile and there was no pressure 
for radical change. The speaker noted that the Chilean transition to democracy has been politically 
stable and the country has enjoyed considerable economic success compared to the rest of Latin 
America. However, it was noted that Chile has high rates of inequality and the 1980 Constitution, 
which was intended to create a ‘protected democracy’, although amended, remains in effect.
The second presentation focused on outlining the complexities, challenges, and opportunities of 
Chile’s transition towards democracy. The speaker began by noting that Chile is often presented as 
a successful case of democratization within Latin America and the world. It was stated that political 
stability, economic growth, and the strengthening of its institutions are recognized as characteristic 
of this post-dictatorial period and Chile is today ranked highly on global indicators relating to 
democracy, rule of law, and governability. During the first two post-dictatorial governments, Chile’s 
economic growth was double the regional average and the country experienced a rapid and extensive 
reduction in poverty as well as substantial progress on social indicators, including life expectancy and 
employment rates. The speaker argued that these positive outcomes resulted from the structural 
transformations that were introduced during the dictatorship and were consolidated after 1989.
The speaker argued, however, that the left-wing coalition governments left very little room for civil 
society actors, with the result that the civil society that had been active during the dictatorship
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became fragmented and deactivated. The government and political parties highly controlled political 
participation and as a result, social demands were channelled through institutional mechanisms. 
The speaker described this as a top-down governance strategy in which the fast expansion of mass 
consumption and major neoliberal reforms redefined the relationship between the society and 
politics. 
The speaker then moved to the second part of the presentation, which related to the 2011 ‘political 
earthquake’ in Chile. It was noted that in 2010, a right-wing government was elected for the first time 
since the dictatorship and in 2011, the largest demonstrations for 20 years took place. The context 
rapidly switched from a passive civil society to widespread mobilization, constant demonstrations, 
and violent unrest in cities across Chile. The demonstrations began by calling for improvements 
in the quality of public education, but in the subsequent years, demonstrators have protested for 
other issues including pension reform and environmental rights. The speaker contended that the 
aftershocks of these demonstrations are still present in the Chilean political landscape and these 
movements redefined the Chilean political agenda. For example, when the current, left-wing 
President Michelle Bachelet was re-elected in 2013, she incorporated the social movements’ demands 
for a new constitution and free public education into her political programme. However, the speaker 
observed that these developments have been insufficient to stem declines in public trust in Chile’s 
institutions and in the number of people voting in elections. The speaker noted that the growth in 
demonstrations and the rise in disaffection with democracy have been interpreted by some scholars 
as signs that the Chilean model has failed.
In the third part of the presentation, the speaker presented and analysed three hypotheses that have 
been put forward by scholars and politicians to explain Chileans’ dissatisfaction with the political 
system. First, some commentators have attributed these trends to the origins of the Chilean political 
and economic model in the authoritarian regime. Today, the constitution, the education system, 
the pension system, and other aspects of Chilean society are considered products of the Pinochet 
government that have endured into the democratic era. Since the eruption of the demonstrations, 
the legitimacy of the model has been questioned. However, the speaker discounted this explanation 
by observing that many countries have constitutions that were not drawn up through democratic, 
inclusive, and participative means. 
A second hypothesis relates to the highly unequal levels of income distribution in contemporary 
Chilean society, which is viewed as a product of the limited capability of the free-market economic 
model to produce social equity. Again, the speaker expressed doubt about the robustness of this 
explanation by noting that inequality has existed in Chile since colonial times. It was also observed 
that wealth distribution is a problem in many countries, but does not necessarily give rise to political 
disaffection and demonstrations. 
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The third hypothesis explored by the speaker was that in recent decades, Chile has undergone a 
modernization process and has reached a development threshold with higher wealth, and greater 
access to education, health care, and information. The speaker suggested that this could have 
contributed to the expansion of Chileans’ normative horizon beyond material integration to more 
symbolic integration, represented by a growing appetite for equity, fairness, and social protection. 
This in turn could have led to greater scepticism about the authoritarian origins of Chile’s political and 
economic model and the inequality problem. The speaker stated that modernization is a process full 
of contradictions: it may produce a wave of discomfort because it brings more freedom but leaves 
people more alone and dissatisfied.
The speaker closed the presentation by noting that the end of Chile’s transition to democracy has 
been proclaimed several times: when Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998, when Pinochet died 
in 2006, when President Sebastián Piñera and the first right-wing government was elected in 2010. 
However, the presenter contended that the Chilean transition is an ongoing phenomenon, even 
though the dictatorship ended 28 years ago. It was argued that at times, it seems to advance, and at 
other times, it seems to recede. Overall, the speaker argued that modernization is strongly linked to 
ending the authoritarian legacy and improving the quality of its democracy.
The ideas raised in the group discussions following the presentations included the following: 
•	 The success of Chile’s transition to democracy: one participant noted that Chile has been rated 
as a consolidated democracy in the Polity IV ranking for several years, and asked whether based 
on the challenges to Chile’s democracy identified in the presentations, whether there are problems 
with existing indices and whether new definitions of democratic governance are needed. The 
resulting discussion noted that there are well-established problems with existing democracy 
indicators. It was further argued that Chile’s wave of demonstrations should be viewed as an 
indicator of the success of the transition. This argument noted that in contrast to the dictatorial 
period, demonstrations can now take place in Chile, and that the demonstrators’ demands are for 
better quality of education and environmental rights rather than political participation rights. It 
was further argued that although political participation through elections has been decreasing 
in Chile, the demonstrations offer people new ways of influencing the political agenda and have 
allowed more voices to be heard.
•	 The role of international and foreign drivers: this discussion noted that different international 
actors have played positive and negative roles during the dictatorship and transition. For example, 
the CIA had played a strong role in supporting the military coup. In contrast, international human 
rights actors worked with Chilean human rights defenders to build pressure on the dictatorship. 
During the transition, there was limited international intervention, which it was argued was 
because international actors were happy with the direction and approach of the Chilean 
transition. However, with respect to transitional justice, the Inter-American human rights system
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has been influential in shaping moves towards greater truth and accountability for human rights 
violations committed during the dictatorship.
•	 Tradition of democracy and the rule of law in Chile: the discussion explored the extent to which 
the political, legal, and economic history of Chile since independence could in part explain the 
success of its transition. It was noted that Chile had a long history of democracy prior to the 
Pinochet regime, established political parties, and a strong rule of law tradition. While the rule of 
law was impaired during Pinochet regime, the idea remained, in that sense, institutions continued 
to function throughout that period. However, it was noted that during the early years of the 
transition, although the military had left power, Pinochet continued as a senator for life and the 
military had a high degree of autonomy. In addition, the Pinochet-era constitution, although 
amended, remains in place and efforts to replace it have been delayed.
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Kenya and Zimbabwe
The session covering Kenya and Zimbabwe included three presentations. Two focused on the 
political and economic conditions in Kenya and explored how these relate to violent conflict and 
transitional justice. The third presentation addressed the situation in Zimbabwe, focusing on the 
background and challenges associated with the recent military coup and structural challenges 
such as impunity.
The first presentation on Kenya focused on the economic and political structures in the country, 
including an overview of current and past economic policies and the challenges associated with 
them. The presenter provided an overview of Kenya’s foreign and economic policies from the first 
post-independence government to the current administration. In this regard, the presenter explained 
that the country has historically pursued a policy of non-alignment with the West and Soviet bloc, 
though maintaining diplomatic relations with both. The presenter also noted that the economic 
structures inherited from the colonial period meant that production has focused on primary 
commodities for export and that only subsistence wages were paid. Poverty was therefore seen as a 
key challenge, although the presenter stated that post-independence governments have put in place 
a range of policy measures to tackle it. These have generally been based on a liberal economic model, 
including most recently the 2030 Vision (adopted in 2007). Although these policies have had some 
positive impact on reducing poverty, the presenter observed that poverty levels and inequality remain 
high.
The presenter further commented on democracy, noting that Kenya is formally a multi-party 
democracy but one which faces significant democratic challenges, including frequent electoral 
violence. At the same time, the presenter linked reform processes in Kenya to the resolution of the 
widespread violence that followed the 2007 elections. In this regard, the speaker emphasized that a 
new constitution adopted in 2010 provides for significant progress, including devolved government, 
an extensive bill of rights, and other reforms. As an example of its positive impact, the presenter 
observed that the institutional reform facilitated by the 2010 constitution installed more faith by 
politicians in state institutions, evidenced by the losing side to the 2013 elections pursuing a judicial 
resolution of the electoral dispute rather than calling for its supporters to take to the streets. 
The presenter also commented on the recent electoral crisis in Kenya that involved an initial election 
in August 2016, which was later annulled by the Supreme Court. Fresh elections followed shortly after, 
which the main opposition candidate boycotted, followed by demonstrations and a level of violence.
The presenter further spoke about trade, noting that Kenya is a member of a range of economic 
blocks such as the East African Community, which is seen to generally benefit economic growth in 
Kenya.
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The presenter concluded by pointing to key drivers of election violence in the country, including: 
1. Inequality
2. Inequitable geographical distribution of resources
3. Failure to address historical injustices
4. Discrimination against vulnerable groups including women




8. An absence of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms relating to a sentiment among Kenyans 
that ‘all problems are legal rather than political’
9. A capitalist model that undermines national cohesion and unity because a small group of persons 
have gained excessively from private ownership
10. A police force based on a ‘colonial mentality’ that often uses excessive force
11. Challenges associated with international institutions, specifically the failure of the ICC to advance 
accountability for the 2007-2008 post-election violence
12. The failure of the UN Human Rights Council to adequately address violations in Kenya
13. The absence of effective ‘cash transfer systems’ targeted at disadvantaged communities, such as 
those used in Brazil
The presenter finally remarked that liberalism, democratization, and economic development are not 
sufficient to guarantee long-lasting peace and security in transitional societies such as Kenya.
The second presentation on Kenya focused on examining the impact of transitional justice on the 
country’s political culture. The presenter started by outlining the background to transitional justice in 
Kenya, including international mediation efforts relating to the disputed 2007 elections. The presenter 
also provided an overview of the mechanisms put in place to address the post-election violence, 
including criminal accountability; a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC); efforts 
aimed at reparations and advancing victims’ rights; and legal and institutional reforms. 
Next, the presenter set out three topics of relevance to the overall theme of the workshop, namely
1. Democracy, economic liberalism, and violence
2. Transitional justice and political culture
3. Global economic forces, justice and transition
With respect to the first topic, the presenter’s main argument was that a political and economic 
system, including a (partly) failed democracy and largely unrestricted market mechanisms coupled 
with corruption and nepotism has been a central cause of violence in the country. In this regard, the
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presenter observed that the formal aspects of democracy, such as a multi-party system and 
regular elections, are less important from the perspective of preventing violent conflict compared 
to substantive issues relating to political identity and political programmes, transparency, and 
accountability.
Concerning the second topic, the presenter argued that rather than facilitating transition and 
contributing to a change in political culture, political and economic elites who wish to maintain the 
status quo have captured and/or manipulated transitional justice in Kenya. The presenter observed 
that the political and historical narratives developed by the country’s political and economic elites 
have proven highly efficient in undermining transitional justice efforts, thus challenging assumptions 
in the scholarship that law can transcend politics and be an independent and strong driver of political 
change.
For the third topic, the presenter observed that while major powers, including the US and the UK, 
initially supported transitional justice efforts, they later downplayed the importance of human rights, 
the rule of law, and accountability and prioritized other interests including perceived security and 
economic interests in the region. The presenter emphasized that the consequences previously pointed 
to by especially the US administration of electing a candidate suspected of crimes against humanity 
never materialized. Central to this presentation was an argument that multi-party democracy 
coupled with a particular version of the liberal economic model, has been a source of conflict, rather 
than a solution, in Kenya. Part of the reason for this is that democracy has not been associated with 
issue-driven politics and the political and economic system has permitted high levels of corruption, 
nepotism, clientelism, and highly unequal distribution of resources.
The third presentation in this session focused on the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe. 
The presenter first provided an overview of key developments in the country since independence, 
including controversies surrounding the Mugabe regime and a detailed description of the context 
surrounding the recent military coup in the country. In this regard, the presenter observed that the 
unconstitutional actions of the military, though unexpected, coincided with calls for profound political 
change among large segments of the population, something which must be viewed in light of the 
violence and impunity endorsed by the Mugabe regime. At the same time, the presenter observed 
that the military coup sets a dangerous precedent, in that the military has established itself as an 
arbitrator of political processes that endangers democratic transition.
The presenter next focused on the topic ‘violence and democratic recession’, emphasizing that for 
more than half a century, Zimbabwe’s politics has been embedded in a tradition of violence and 
that little that has been done since colonial times for Zimbabweans to rehabilitate them from that 
violence. The presenter argued that there has been an assumption among political elites in the 
country, inherited from colonial times, that violence is a tool that can be used at any time for control 
and domination, something that has repressed and traumatized large segments of the population.
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The presenter also addressed the current economic structures in the country, noting that economic 
growth – including making Zimbabwe an attractive destination for capital – is viewed as the primary 
goal by the political leadership and democratic and rule of law ideals have been subordinated to that. 
According to the presenter, the focus on neoliberal economic reforms, economic growth, and stability 
has come to the detriment of transitional justice, including efforts to promote memorialization, 
dignity, restitution, and accountability. The presenter argued that to be successful, a transition in 
Zimbabwe must address human rights issues, including accountability.
The presenter further addressed the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission Act, which was 
signed into law in January 2018. This Act made operational a Commission that was created by the 
2013 Constitution and was appointed in 2016. Section 252 of the Constitution sets out the key 
objectives of the Commission, which include:
•	 Ensuring post-conflict justice, healing, and reconciliation
•	 Implementing programmes to promote national healing, unity and cohesion, and the peaceful 
resolution of disputes
•	 Encouraging people to tell the truth about the past and to facilitate the making of amends and 
the provision of justice
•	 Developing procedures and institutions to facilitate dialogue between political parties, 
communities, and other groups
•	 Taking appropriate action on complaints it receives from the public
The presenter argued that the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission could present 
an important opportunity to address the cycles of violence in the country, provided that the 
commissioners are committed to peace and reconciliation. Noting that victims must be at the centre 
of the debate, the presenter concluded by observing that the current regime has prioritized economic 
stability above anything else, whereas transitional justice and human rights issues have received 
insufficient attention.
In the debate following the presentations, a range of case specific and more theoretical issues were raised:
•	 Transitional justice in the absence of a pre-existing political transition: it was discussed 
whether it is possible for transitional justice to succeed in the absence of a pre-existing political 
transition. Participants addressing that topic were generally sceptical of the idea often endorsed 
in transitional justice scholarship that the law has significant, independent potential to transcend 
politics and facilitate profound change in the absence of political will. One participant added 
that to understand these dynamics, it is necessary to examine the resources available to various 
stakeholders, in this regard noting that states will tend to have significantly more resources than 
actors working to promote transitional justice goals, including civil society actors and international 
organizations such as the ICC.
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•	 The role of international organizations, foreign powers, and economic actors in transitional 
justice: the debate raised questions relating to the role of international organizations, foreign 
powers, and economic actors in transitional justice. Participants debated how international 
organizations, specifically the ICC, might affect and frame transitions. In this regard, one 
participant noted that even if institutions such as the ICC face significant obstacles in giving 
effect to accountability norms, they could not be disregarded analytically since they can have a 
significant impact on political developments in intervention countries. As to the role of foreign 
powers, one participant questioned whether these could be expected to set aside economic 
and security interests where such interests are perceived to conflict with accountability and 
other transitional justice objectives. Concerning the role of economic actors in transitions, it 
was noted that such actors may play a role both in facilitating and funding violence, but also in 
ending violent conflict, especially when they perceive their economic interests are jeopardized 
by instability. In this regard, one participant emphasized that the business community in Kenya 
played a central role in ending the post-election violence as it became clear that the escalating 
violence was threatening economic stability in the country.
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Tunisia
The session on Tunisia included two presentations. The first focused on the economic and political 
conditions in the country prior to and after the 2011 uprising and the second analysed the 
transitional justice measures put in place to address violations in the country.
The first presentation focused on understanding the factors that triggered the uprising in Tunisia 
in 2011. The presentation commenced by setting out the background and context of the uprising. 
The presenter noted that unemployment, regional inequality, corruption, lack of political freedom, 
and poor living conditions were key underlying reasons for the protests that led to the political 
transition. The presenter emphasized the importance of examining the economic conditions in the 
pre-transition phase, noting that while Tunisia was doing better than its Middle Eastern and North 
African neighbours in terms of economic growth, it should not necessarily be viewed as a success 
story. Despite economic growth of about five per cent during the 2000s and a decreasing poverty 
rate, income inequality has remained high and persistent. Further, distribution of wealth and 
resources is not equal across the country, as large disparities remain in economic welfare and access 
to basic services such as healthcare and sanitation.
On this basis, the presenter observed the existence of two types of inequalities, namely economic 
inequality and inequality of opportunity, which were both seen as potential drivers of violent conflict 
because they damage social trust. Drawing on economic data collected, the presenter concluded 
that households’ demographic composition, educational level of the head, and regional and urban/
rural locations are the main drivers of overall inequality in Tunisia. The presenter further observed 
that household geographic characteristics (region of residence and urban-rural status) were found 
to significantly contribute to the welfare disparity in the country and their magnitude seems to rise 
over time. On this basis, the presenter observed that targeted interventions and more appropriate 
investments in favour of the less advantaged population in rural and inland areas in Tunisia could have 
significant potential for improving the overall equity in the country.
The second presentation on Tunisia provided an overview and discussion of transitional justice 
processes put in place following the 2011 uprising. The presenter first noted that two commissions 
were created by the interim authorities after President Ben Ali left office: one to investigate 
corruption and embezzlement charges directed against the Tunisian government, and one to 
investigate the use of excessive force by security forces (which led to 38 deaths in the context of the 
2011 uprising). The presenter observed that Ben Ali’s family is alleged to have been a main beneficiary 
of corruption.
Next, the presenter stated that the first truth commission, established after Ben Ali’s departure, had 
a limited mandate to gather victim testimonies relating to violence occurring in the period from the 
start of the revolution in December 2010 until the first elections in October 2011. The presenter 
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further explained that key questions relating to the mandate and operations of the commission had 
not been adequately addressed, including how and by whom reparations could be provided in the 
absence of a clear legal framework; the amount of money that the government could budget for 
reparations; and issues relating to the definition of victims.
The presenter further explained that in the post-Ben Ali context, the transitional government created 
a Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice in January 2012, and in June 2014 the Instance 
Vérité et Dignité (the Truth and Dignity Commission) was established. It is expected to release its final 
report and recommendations in 2018 or 2019. The commission is tasked with investigating human 
rights violations since 1955 (and thus including violations committed in the last phase of colonial 
rule). It is empowered to receive submissions, hear testimonies, and provide reparations, collectively or 
individually. So far, the commission has received around 62,000 submissions and 11,000 persons have 
provided testimony, said the presenter.
Lastly, the presenter addressed the so-called ‘economic reconciliation law’, adopted in September 
2017, which is intended to grant amnesty to former and current regime figures, state agents, and 
business executives accused of corruption and other economic crimes. The presenter was sceptical 
of the law, noting that it will suspend all prosecution, trials, or sentences against public servants and 
other agents for acts linked to corruption and embezzlement. The presenter further noted that the 
law would prevent future vetting of the public administration, thereby allowing former and current 
state officials and others who aided, abetted or otherwise assisted a system characterized by abuse 
to benefit from a general amnesty. The presentation concluded by showing a short documentary 
relating to the Tunisian revolution and the transitional justice measures discussed in the presentation.
In the debate following the presentations, participants raised questions and made comments relating 
to case specific and more general questions, including:
•	 Transparency and appropriate mandates for institutions of transitional justice: participants 
in particular discussed the mandate of Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission, including its 
temporal jurisdiction that allows it to investigate abuses under the last years of colonial rule. Civil 
society had been suspicious about this broad temporal mandate, which participants explained was 
a consequence of political agendas of specific political parties. More broadly, participants noted 
the lack of transparency in the creation and operation of transitional justice measures in the 
country, in this regard pointing the recently adopted legal framework that facilitates amnesty for 
economic crimes. 
•	 Democratic consolidation: participants commented on the prospects for consolidating 
democracy in Tunisia and the extent to which Tunisia should be viewed as a success story in the 
region. One point made in this regard was that various democratic institutions mandated by the 
Transitional Constitution are yet to be established or have been created in ways that are not 
consistent with the principles of the Constitution.
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Haiti
The presentations on Haiti focused on the challenges of democracy building in a context where, 
with the assistance of foreign powers, political stability is prioritized over the protection of 
human rights and enhancement of democratic processes with the result that social struggles and 
economic conflicts are frozen or denied.
The first speaker on Haiti began their presentation by asserting that the development of democracy 
and the transformation of state structures is a radical project that is inherently messy, conflict-ridden, 
incremental, and uncertain. Therefore, it should not be assumed, as many commentators do, that 
democracy in Haiti is a failure: it is simply a young democracy with some serious legacy challenges 
that it must confront.
The next part of the presentation focused on the historical context of democracy development in 
Haiti. Haiti is part of a small island, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. It has never been at 
war in modern times but Haitian history is marked by political conflict. It became independent from 
France in 1804. The speaker said that for the next 50 years, the state, which was ruled by generals at 
that time, was heavily preoccupied with avoiding another French invasion. Between 1888 and 1915, 
no Haitian president completed his seven-year term: ten were either killed or overthrown. Between 
1862 and 1915, the United States sent warships into Haitian waters 17 times and then occupied the 
country from 1915 to 1934.
During the Cold War, Haiti was ruled by the Duvalier family dictatorship, which was supported by the 
United States Agency for International Development. The speaker argued that free and fair elections 
did not take place until 1990, nearly five years after ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier fled to France ending the 
Duvalier regime. The former priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected with a large majority but was in 
power for only eight months before he was ousted in a military coup in 1991. The military ruled Haiti 
for three years but was eventually removed following armed intervention from the United States.
Aristide returned in 1994 but was only permitted to serve the remainder of his term and could not 
stand for election in 1996. He was re-elected in 2000, but the speaker noted the election led to 
political deadlock between pro-Aristide and anti-Aristide forces. The speaker stated that Aristide was 
ousted in 2004 following a wave of armed violence and was ‘persuaded’ by the United States (along 
with Canada and France) to go into exile.
The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was deployed in June 2004 and a UN mission 
has been present in Haiti ever since. The speaker added that following the earthquake in 2010, 
international donors came in en masse and supplanted the Haitian state in order to begin 
reconstruction. Citing Sydney Mintz, the presenter argued that if the policy prescriptions of 
international donors continue to sustain the present distribution of economic power in Haiti none of 
their efforts will effect a long-term political benefit. 
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The presenter observed that Haiti’s population has been and continues to be deeply divided 
between the elite and the masses of Haitians, which is reflected in an urban/rural divide, a French/
Creole language divide, a light/black skin colour divide, a literacy divide, and an economic divide. 
The wealthiest one per cent of the population monopolizes 46 per cent of the national revenue. The 
speaker said that Haiti’s rural citizens are overlooked, notably through the lack of public services such 
as education and health care.
In the speaker’s opinion, the tendency of the international community to prioritize political stability 
above all other goals puts unrealistic expectations on Haitian society. Societies emerging from 
authoritarian regimes or armed conflict take time to adjust and frequently the adjustment is marked 
by violence, as was the case in both France and the United States. The speaker suggested that the 
‘keeping the pressure cooker lid tight down on the pot’ approach of Western donors informs the type 
of democracy that emerges. Whose interests will govern if social struggles are frozen or discouraged?
The speaker further argued that the weakness of democracy building programmes in Haiti is 
that they focus on the machinery, on capacity building, and pay insufficient attention to the 
socio-economic structures of power in a society. For example, too many programmes are aimed at 
training and too few are directed towards differentiating state institutions from oligarchic control. The 
speaker argued that a lot of attention is paid to institutional building but comparatively little is paid 
to how institutions are built. Institutions emerge from social struggle in an organic process, in which 
outsiders should not engage. If outsiders do engage in these battles, they automatically delegitimize 
the emerging institutions because of their foreign imprint.
The second speaker focused on the role of the United Nations in prioritizing political stability by 
armed force to the detriment of human rights protection and democracy building. MINUSTAH was 
deployed in 2004 in the wake of the coup against Aristide with a mandate to, among other things, 
provide security so that elections could be held. As early as December 2004, MINUSTAH’s first force 
commander, General Heleno Ribeiro Periera, complained to the Brazilian Congress that the mission 
was under heavy pressure from the United States, Canada, and France to use intense force in Cité 
Soleil to bring order and end the frequent kidnappings and lorry hijackings that were disrupting 
economic activity in the business districts of Port-au-Prince. Cité Soleil was a poor marginalized 
community of 300,000-400,000 people where support for Aristide’s party was strong and where 
armed gangs were believed to be active.
The first elections to be held after the 2004 coup against Aristide took place in February 2006. They 
had previously been postponed four times. In the run up to the election and continuing to 2007, 
MINUSTAH carried out a series of major armed raids in Cité Soleil. One of the largest took place on 
6 July 2005, a few months before the elections were initially scheduled to take place. MINUSTAH 
stated that it expended 22,700 bullets, 78 grenades, and five mortars in the densely populated 
neighbourhood where many people lived in houses made of salvaged metal that were easily 
penetrated by bullets. The speaker said that it is likely that at least 20 people were killed in that raid, 
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in addition to the gang members who were targeted. It was noted that at least three children died as 
a result of wounds they sustained whilst in their beds. In another operation on 21-22 December 2006, 
MINUSTAH stated that it expended 10,000 bullets. The speaker said that it is estimated that 20-30 
people died on that occasion. The speaker argued that the excessive force used by MINUSTAH during 
the period 2005-2007 was largely in response to pressure from Haiti’s elites and from foreign powers 
to forcibly secure political stability so as to protect the interests of Haiti’s business community. 
Other approaches were pursued to resist policies introduced by President Aristide and to weaken 
his support. For example, in 2003, Aristide’s government had introduced legislation to increase the 
minimum wage but had been persuaded by the United States that it would not be in Haiti’s interest 
to do so. In addition, the speaker noted that prior to the 2006 election, Haiti’s Provisional Electoral 
Council announced that no voting would take place in Cité Soleil. Registered voters from Cité Soleil 
had to leave their neighbourhood to vote. In making a more general observation about Haitian 
elections, the speaker said that a repeated refrain heard across all sectors of Haitian society is that in 
Haiti ‘we do not have elections, we have selections’.
The speaker observed that many legislators in the Haitian Senate regarded MINUSTAH has an 
occupying force whose role was to ensure that factories and other export-oriented businesses were 
protected from political violence and from political demands that might affect their profits. The 
speaker noted that the Senate repeatedly passed resolutions demanding that the mission leave 
(including a unanimous resolution in 2013 demanding that MINUSTAH leave by June 2014) but these 
were ignored by the UN Security Council, which relied on the president’s consent to the mission’s 
presence. MINUSTAH’s mission finally ended in October 2017 but it has been replaced by a smaller 
police mission known as MINUJUSTH.
During the subsequent discussion, a number of issues arose:
•	 Aid programmes in Haiti: one participant noted that they had no objection to aid per se but 
questioned whether aid was being spent on the right needs. In this speaker’s view, aid money 
would be much better spent on literacy programmes than on democracy building programmes, 
which cannot succeed because of political barriers.
•	 Potential for the consolidation of democracy in Haiti: one participant responded that 
democracy building is about the social forces developing and creating it. Therefore, instead of 
supporting sweat shops, which only benefit the elites who profit from them, money should be 
put into economic programmes that reach out to those have been disenfranchised and that 
empower people economically in the rural areas. This participant said that money should be put 
into strengthening those social forces in the country that are wanting political change rather than 
supporting elites who have no interest in democracy and who benefit from having a population 
that is uneducated since an uneducated population provides a source of cheap labour.
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•	 Effectiveness of foreign aid: it was suggested that any intervention from foreign powers, for 
example, in the form of aid, depends on the support of the host state government. If the host 
government is not interested in funding rural economies, there is little that the aid donating 
countries can do about it. One participant said that given the extent of the donor aid contribution 
to the national budget, aid agencies do in fact have considerable ability to demand that a certain 
amount of the aid is spent in certain ways and the government probably could be persuaded 
to invest in a literacy campaign. The participant suggested that donating countries, particularly 
Canada, are wasting their money because the projects they are funding are not bringing about 
the goals they hoped.
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About the Transitional Justice Institute
The Transitional Justice Institute engages in theoretical, critical, and methodologically and ethically 
rigorous research relating to all aspects of the field of transitional justice. TJI is committed to 
engaging with civic leaders to ensure our research informs and shapes public awareness and 
policymaking of transitional justice-related issues in Northern Ireland as well as nationally, regionally, 
and internationally. The Institute also provides a supportive research environment for our scholarly 
community, which includes promoting the development of a new generation of transitional justice 
scholars through our doctoral and taught programmes.
For more information see:
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T: @tji_
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